For prejudiced individuals with a strong prevention focus, information that disconfirms a stereotype is a threat to efficient self-regulation and triggers self-defense processes. It produces vigilance, agitation, and higher attention to both the disconfirming target and its background information, leading to better memory for the inconsistent information. We predicted that the effect would be enhanced as social relevance increases. As predicted, participants high in sexism and with a strong prevention focus better remembered gender-stereotype incongruent information, and this effect was accentuated when social relevance was high. These participants experienced agitation-related discomfort rather than dejection-related discomfort from the incongruency, further supporting the proposal that stereotype disconfirmation produced a self-defense threat response.
Imagine you are a young man, and for an entire lifetime you believed that women lack mathematical talent. Your peers love your sexist jokes about dumb women, and at work you seem to be efficient in giving all the problems that include math to your male cooperators-most of the time they are solved correctly in record time. Then you learn that your neighbor's daughter, and not your son, won the nationwide math competition this year, and second place also went to a girl. What would your reaction be, and what would you do with this inconsistent information?
We assume that disconfirming an important belief about a certain group of people can pose a threat to one's efficient self-regulation. From the literature, we find that there are two important ways that one might deal with such inconsistent information: (a) one can ignore it and forget it (e.g., Sedikides & Green, 2000; 2004) , which produces better memory for congruent information, or (b) one can try to resolve the inconsistency (e.g., explaining the inconsistency away), which is a cognitive mechanism that produces better memory for incongruent information by increasing attention during encoding (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer & Martin, 1986 ; for reviews, see Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992) .
There are important similarities and differences between studies showing a congruency effect from ignoring or blocking information and an incongruency effect from resolving input. Our earlier example is quite similar to the situation in which people experience explicit negative feedback, as used in most studies on self-defense and in this Special Issue. Being initially convinced that a belief one holds is true in a domain of high personal relevance, and then having to face the fact that the belief is most probably wrong, can be devastating and cause major emotional discomfort. Thus, belief disconfirmation can be experienced as negative feedback directed at the self. A sexist for whom it is important to believe that women cannot perform well in math might feel anxious if he finds unarguable evidence that this valued part of his personal world view is not actually true. In this sense, disconfirming information can have an impact on the self that is similar to direct negative feedback, such as feedback that one is an unkind person or an unintelligent person. That is, disconfirming feedback can be experienced as personal, as directed to oneself. It can be very disturbing, implying that there is something wrong with oneself. Indeed, it could even imply that one is unkind or unintelligent for having held this false belief.
Might a person ignore such disconfirming information? In our example, the evidence is strong and striking, and thus cannot be easily ignored. In other situations, however, disconfirming information might be ignored. For example, using a person memory paradigm, Sedikides and Green (2000; 2004) have demonstrated that under certain circumstances people ignore negative information directed at them. Their research showed that participants remembered less disconfirming negative information (e.g., a test shows that you would often lie to your parents) than confirming information (e.g., a test shows that you would keep secrets when asked to) when the information described central aspects of the participant's self, was diagnostic (Sedikides & Green, 2000) , and was negative rather than just inconsistent (Sedikides & Green, in press ). Importantly, the authors argue that the inconsistent information under these circumstances might be ignored at the retrieval stage rather than at the encoding stage. In addition the authors argue that performance in a recognition paradigm, where all the information is presented, would be different because then the inconsistent information could not be blocked or ignored anymore. Given these arguments, there could be better memory for inconsistent information if the information cannot be ignored and the self-defense mechanism is working at the time of encoding.
In previous research, we have found evidence for this alternative possibility. Using a person memory paradigm (Förster, Higgins, & Strack 2000) , we showed that participants recognized more stereotype-inconsistent information about a fictitious target (e.g., a woman likes wrestling) than stereotype-consistent information (e.g., a woman likes window shopping). In addition, using a recognition task sensitive to the locus of the effect (whether it occurred at encoding or at the stage of retrieval), we also showed that the inconsistent information was better encoded. We explained this effect in terms of motivational mechanisms-mechanisms that are actually those of self-defense.
Like other self-defense phenomena, we predicted the effect to be moderated by personal relevance and diagnosticity. More specifically, we suggested that disconfirmation of a belief can be experienced as a personal threat to both efficient and effective self-regulation. In order to create a threat, the incongruency must be experienced as discrepant to a belief that is subjectively important to an individual (i.e., a belief of personal relevance). Beliefs or theories about persons or groups (i.e., stereotypes) are crucial for survival (Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996) . They serve the self-regulatory function of maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of social contact (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) . People differ in the extent to which they endorse stereotypic beliefs. Stereotypic beliefs are endorsed more by chronically prejudiced than chronically non-prejudiced individuals. Thus stereotype disconfirmation should be experienced as more threatening by prejudiced individuals (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997) .
As reported in the literature, a threat induces vigilance (Förster, Grant, Idson, & Higgins, 2002) , and this vigilance should produce higher attention to the inconsistent information than the consistent information (Bel-more, 1987; Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Hilton, Klein, & von Hippel, 1991) . We also found that vigilance produces better memory for the background of the incongruent information. Why would this be the case?
From a motivational perspective, in order to prepare an appropriate response to a threatening object, it is important to know where the threat comes from. For example, if an object is approaching you, it is important to know both what and where it is. We assume, then, that threat information is processed configurally in what/where units. Because of the attention they receive, memory for such threatening what/where units should be better than for non-threatening information. This implies that beyond the often-suggested epistemic motivation of "resolving an incongruency among cognitive elements" (Srull & Wyer, 1989) , the vigilance to avoid a threat to self-regulation could also produce better memory for inconsistent information.
To better understand this process, we must explore why threatening information should be encoded in what/where units. First, we know from the cognitive literature that items are better remembered when encoded with context information. One prominent example is the "method of loci," which enhances long-term memory performance (Yates, 1966 , summarized in Luria, 1969 . This technique requires participants to memorize a geographical entity (e.g., a building or a street) and then to place items one wants to remember in different locations of this area. As the person "walks" through the area, the various locations trigger the items placed there and can aid the person's memory of the list. The efficacy of this technique has been well established (Crovitz, 1971; Lea, 1975; Ross & Lawrence, 1968) . We feel that it is functional to remember threatening objects and their places in order to avoid them in the future.
Second, the animal learning literature shows that animals rapidly learn where a threat comes from: Place learning is better and occurs prior to cue learning when there is a threat (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Schmajuk 1990) . In a classic study, for example, Blanchard, Dielman, and Blanchard (1968a, b) showed that shock will cause rats to crouch or freeze, and that this behavior is linked to the place in which it was received. Blanchard and Blanchard (1969) extended this analysis by demonstrating that rats shocked in one place will not crouch if immediately moved to another, neutral place. When later returned to the original threatening place, the rats crouched.
The authors concluded that shock crouching was not a response to the pain per se; rather it was a response to the place where pain had been inflicted (e.g., situational fear). From these findings, researchers argued about a relation between the hippocampus and spatial learning (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978 , 1979 , a region which is also important for approach/avoidance responses (Eichelman, 1971) . Recently, they also identified "place cells" in the hippocampus (O'Keefe, 1976; Muller, Kubie, & Ranck, 1987) , which were thought to fire selectively when the animal is in the environment during spatial exploration. However, recent research seems to indicate that the hippocampus might be responsible for configural encoding in general, rather than being restricted to space information (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Schmajuk & DiCarlo, 1992) . From a functional point of view, place learning is especially important when an animal is threatened because a new safe zone is needed for escape, making discrimination between safe and unsafe places essential (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978) . One can conclude from this literature that it is important to learn where a threat comes from-threats enhance vigilance and increase attention to both background and target information, with this higher attention producing better memory.
Vigilance has been shown to be the strategic orientation of individuals with a prevention focus on responsibilities (oughts) and non-losses. In contrast, individuals with a promotion focus on aspirations (ideals) and gains have a strategic orientation towards eagerness (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Friedman, 1999 ; for a more in-depth discussion, see Higgins, 1997 Higgins, , 1998 . When individuals are vigilant from a prevention focus, a discrepancy from their prejudiced beliefs should be experienced as a threat and should produce agitation-related emotions (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) . Individuals in a promotion focus would not experience such a discrepancy as a threat and would not become agitated.
Our proposed self-regulatory model of belief disconfirmation implies that the higher the subjective importance of a belief (i.e., for individuals endorsing prejudiced beliefs), the greater the threat and vigilance will be for individuals with a strong prevention focus, which in turn will increase sensitivity to and memory for inconsistent what/where units. Influences of prejudice and prevention focus on increasing memory for disconfirming information was demonstrated recently with sexism as the prejudiced belief and accessible ought self-guides (beliefs about one's own duties and responsibilities) as the chronic prevention focus (Förster et al., 2000) . By measuring chronic sexism and regulatory focus strength we ensured that the inconsistencies people faced were both self-relevant and diagnostic and, thus, entailed negative feedback on their personal value systems and beliefs.
Within a typical person memory paradigm, participants had to form an impression about a target person who was either male or female and was described by gender stereotype consistent, inconsistent, and irrelevant attributes. Later, they were asked to recollect the information in a background-sensitive recognition test (i.e., the process dissociation procedure [Jacoby, 1991; and Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993] that is described in more detail below). As predicted, the stronger participants' sexism and prevention focus was, the better their memory was for incon-sistent what/where units. Moreover, the higher the combination of sexism and prevention focus strength was, the more agitation-related emotions (i.e., worry and tension) were experienced, reflecting the fact that self-defensive mechanisms were triggered by the inconsistencies.
In the previous research the relevance of the stereotypic beliefs was indirectly measured rather than manipulated. Therefore, in addition to the paradigm described above, the present study manipulated outcome dependency to vary the personal relevance of the stereotype-related processing (Erber & Fiske, 1984) . The literature has shown that, while forming an impression, participants spend more time on inconsistent information if they expect to interact with a target because this increases the social relevance of the information (Erber & Fiske, 1984 ; see also Hilton, Klein, & von Hippel, 1991) . Thus, we told some participants that they would meet the person at some point (the high outcome dependency group), which should enhance the threat of stereotype disconfirmation, and compared them to participants who were told that the target person was fictitious (e.g., low outcome dependency). We also added a moderate outcome dependency group by telling participants that the target was a student from the same university. We predicted that better memory for inconsistent what/where units would be especially strong for participants who were high in both sexism and prevention focus and when the information was made highly socially relevant (i.e., in the high outcome dependency group).
We also expected this effect to be mediated by emotional agitation. Based on previous research, we predicted that the affect from belief disconfirmation should be more agitation-related when experienced by individuals with a strong prevention focus. This is because experiences of pleasure and pain are different for individuals in a promotion than a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997) . Pleasure and pain from promotion success and failure, respectively, are experienced as the presence and absence of positive outcomes (gain/non-gain), whereas pleasure and pain from prevention success and failure, respectively, are experienced as the absence and presence of negative outcomes (non-loss/loss). Thus, individuals with a strong prevention focus, but not individuals with a strong promotion focus, experience agitation-related feelings (e.g., tense, nervous) following failure (Higgins, 1996; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) .
If stereotype disconfirmation is a prevention failure, i.e., is a personal threat as predicted, the disconfirming information should produce specifically agitation-related emotions for high sexist individuals with a strong prevention focus. Förster et al. (2000) found evidence supporting this prediction. They also found that prejudiced participants with a strong prevention focus were more willing to meet the target person than participants low in sexism or high in promotion focus, perhaps be-cause prevention participants feel compelled to check out the target person. To re-examine this effect, participants in the present study were also asked if they wanted to meet the target person.
STUDY METHOD
Participants. One hundred and thirty-eight Columbia University undergraduate students (50 male, 88 female) participated in an experiment on "impression formation" for payment. [Gender of participant had no effect.] They were selected from a larger sample of participants who, four months earlier, completed a computerized measure of self-guide strength as part of a battery of measures. Participants were tested individually. Nine participants were excluded from the analyses because they failed to answer one of the questionnaires.
MATERIALS
Sexism. The modern sexism scale by Swim, Aiken, Hall, and Hunter (1995) was used to determine participants' gender-related prejudice level. This scale was used because it is presumably more robust against demand biases than others (Swim, 1997; Swim et al., 1995) . It also captures the importance of the participants' belief system rather than their feelings against women or knowledge about the stereotype (Esses et al., 1993) .
Strength of Regulatory Focus. To gauge individual differences in promotion and prevention concerns, we utilized a measure developed by Higgins et al. (1997) . Building upon the conception that goal strength is reflected in goal accessibility (cf., Clore, 1994; Frijda, 1996) , this computerized "strength of guide" measure records the time it takes participants to enter a set of three promotion goals (i.e., ideals: hopes or aspirations, posited to represent nurturance concerns) and a set of three prevention goals (i.e., oughts: duties or obligations, posited to represent security concerns). Faster entry times reflect increased accessibility (Fazio, 1986) , and thereby increased strength of concern-theoretically speaking, increased accessibility of promotion or prevention goals is a product of increased rumination concerning these goals, which is itself a function of their importance. Data coding (see Higgins et al., 1997) results in an index of "promotion strength," indicating the importance of promotion concerns, and an index of "prevention strength," indicating the importance of prevention concerns.
To divide participants in terms of chronic regulatory focus, the mean reaction time for the ought strength measure was subtracted from the mean reaction time for the ideal strength measure, so that higher values indicate a more predominant promotion focus and lower values indicate a more predominant prevention focus.
Note that we chose to examine differences in regulatory focus through chronic personality measures rather than by manipulating them because we wanted to assess people's own personal beliefs that are both self-relevant and trigger specific motivations. What is being measured is the chronic accessibility of participants' own personal ought self-beliefs, which concerns their own chronic sense of what is necessary in their self-regulation and what provides them with security. Their stereotypic beliefs about gender are also their own chronic beliefs. We wanted to ensure that participants' vigilance motivation was driven by their own chronic self-beliefs and personal sense of what was necessary to fulfill their security needs. In this case, inconsistent information is a threat because it signals that one's belief is wrong-a belief that is personally important (high sexism), highly relevant in the current situation (high outcome dependency), and is experienced within a prevention system concerned with security (strong ought).
Learning List and Recognition Task. Items describing stereotypically male, female, and neutral interests (e.g., likes window shopping, likes watching scary movies) were taken from the same pool as described in Förster et al. (2000) ; 72 items were selected for the study. As a memory test that is sensitive to capture memory for what/where units, a recognition test based on Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation logic was constructed. This test measures not only how deeply a single item is encoded and remembered, but it also provides information about the context wherein the information had been presented (see Jacoby, 1991; Förster et al., 2000) .
More specifically, two different learning lists were printed on papers of different color, yellow and purple, which contained six female, six male, and six neutral items. Both lists were either labeled with the female name "Pam" or with the male name "John". In the inclusion test, participants were asked to remember items that "appeared on a list," regardless of whether it appeared on the yellow or the purple list. In the exclusion test, they had to remember only those items that had appeared on the purple list. This procedure, as will be described below, allows the identification of background information connected with the target information. In order to solve the exclusion test correctly, one has to remember the background context. Moreover, good performance on this task reflects better encoding because one must remember the original background context that is not presented at the time of the memory test. Furthermore, the background information used in the experiment was not related to the gender stereotype. Therefore, any explanation of our obtained results in terms of some epistemic motivational search in the target configuration in order to resolve an incongruency was ruled out experimentally because it would not be helpful for this kind of task.
The inclusion test, as well as the exclusion test, contained three female, three male, and three neutral targets from the yellow list, three female, three male, and three neutral targets from the purple list, and six female, six male, and six neutral distractors (i.e., items that had not appeared on the lists). Two other sets of learning and recognition tests were constructed so that each item served as both a distractor and a target across participants. The appearance of an item in the exclusion versus inclusion list was also counterbalanced. (Order had no effect). Note that by providing a high proportion of inconsistencies we made sure that this information could not easily be ignored.
Mood Questionnaire. To measure participants' mood, participants rated their current cheerfulness and dejection-related emotions ("happy" and "content," "discouraged" and "disappointed," respectively) and their quiescence and agitation-related emotions ("calm" and "relaxed," "tense" and "worried," respectively) on a 9-point rating scale ("Right now, how ____ do you feel?" from 1 = not at all, to 9 = extremely).
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
Participants filled out the self-regulatory strength measure as a part of a study on "personality questionnaires" and were called back for an experiment on "impression formation" four months later. Immediately after arriving at the experiment, participants were given the first mood questionnaire. All participants were then asked to form an impression about a person. Two lists, one on yellow paper and one on purple paper, were both labeled "Pam" or both labeled "John" and were given to participants in random order. (Neither order nor gender of the label had any effect).
To manipulate outcome dependency, one group was told that they would actually meet the person, a Columbia undergraduate, during the experiment (the high social relevance condition); another group was told that the target was a Columbia undergraduate who they would not necessarily meet (the medium social relevance condition); and the third group was told that the target was a "fictitious person" (the low social relevance condition). Participants were stopped after four minutes of reading. They filled out the same mood questionnaire again. They then rated how much they liked Pam or John and how much they would like to meet the person, both ratings on a 9-point rating scale (1 = not at all, to 9 = very much). After a 40-minute filler interval that contained unrelated tasks, the inclusion test (i.e., remember all items, regardless of the background paper on which they appeared) and the exclusion test (i.e., remember only items that appeared on the purple background list) were given to the participants in a random order. (Order of the test did not affect any of the results). Finally, the participants filled out the Modern Sexism Scale by Swim et al. (1995) . Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.
The experiment consisted of a 3 × 3 mixed factorial design, comparing memory for congruent, incongruent, and neutral information and high, moderate, and low social relevance. Two median splits divided participants into those high versus low in sexism and those with a predominant promotion focus and those with a predominant prevention focus.
RESULTS
Because we were especially interested in participants' memory for the background memory, we only report analyses on the recollection measure of Jacoby's process dissociation procedure (e.g., Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993) . According to "process dissociation" theory, correct recognition can be based on intentional recollection of a target plus background or it could be based on a general feeling of familiarity for an item without the background being recollected. The recollection measure can be derived from the additional exclusion test and captures processes at the time of encoding. For the incongruent input, for example, this measure involves subtracting the background source confusions for incongruent items (from the exclusion test) from the hit rate for incongruent items printed on the purple sheet of paper (from the inclusion test). A combination of high recognition for purple incongruent items and low confusion of purple incongruent items with yellow items would yield a high score on this measure and indicate good memory for the target plus background configuration of the purple incongruent items.
The results are divided into separate sections because sexism and regulatory focus strength were found to be independent from one another-sexism and ideal strength (controlling for ought strength), partial r = .05; p > .50; sexism and ought strength (controlling for ideal strength), partial r = -.03; p > .75 -. In Section I, the influence of sexism on person memory is investigated. In Section II, we examine the influence of regulatory focus strength alone. Section III investigates the interactive effects of these two variables.
SECTION I: SEXISM AS MODERATOR
Likeability Ratings and Desire to Meet the Person. Participants low in sexism (M = 6.65) liked the target person more than participants high in sexism (M = 5.73), as revealed by a significant main effect in a 2 (Sexism) × 3 (Social Relevance) ANOVA, F(1, 123) = 9.73; p < .001. No other significant effects were found. Mean desire to meet the person did not differ significantly as a function of the two factors, either singly or jointly.
Emotions. To test the impact of sexism and social relevance on participants' emotions, four separate analyses of variance were conducted for each of the four types of emotions: (a) cheerfulness-related emotions (happiness, contentment); (b) dejection-related emotions (disappointment, discouragement); (c ) quiescence-related emotions (calmness, relaxation); and (d) agitation-related emotions (tension, worry). For the emotional ratings before and after reading the target person information, separately, the mean rating for each type of emotion was calculated (e.g., tension plus worry ratings divided by two). Then, the mean of the "before" ratings was subtracted from the mean of the "after" ratings such that higher values signified an increase in a type of emotion after reading the target person information. The only significant effect found was a main effect of social relevance for the agitation-related emotions, showing that participants became more agitated if they expected to meet the person (M = 1.75), followed by participants who believed that the target was a Columbia undergraduate (M = .84), followed by participants who read information about a fictitious target (M = .24), F(2, 123) = 7.28; p < .01. No effects were found for the other emotions.
Recollection of Target Plus Background Information (i.e., what/where units).
As a measure of memory for the target plus background configuration, the "yes" responses of the inclusion test and the background source confusions were transformed into Jacoby's recollection measure, as described earlier (for example: hits from the purple list of the inclusion test minus source confusions from the exclusion test). As shown in Table 1 Importantly, these main effects were qualified by two significant interactions. First, recollection was a joint function of social relevance and congruency, F(4, 246) = 5.3; p < .001, reflecting the fact that the incongruency effect was stronger in the high (MIncongruent = .61; MCongruent = .39; MNeutral = .23) and medium (MIncongruent = .63; MCongruent = .38; MNeutral = .20) social relevance conditions than in the low social relevance condition (MIncongruent = .15, MCongruent = .08; MNeutral = .03). Second, as predicted, there was an interaction between sexism and congruency, F(2, 246) = 4.22; p < .05, showing that the incongruency effect was more pronounced for high sexists (MIncongruent = .52; MCongruent = .28; MNeutral = .11) compared to low sexists MIncongruent = .43; MCongruent = .29; MNeutral = .19). No other significant effects were obtained, F < 1.
In sum, the results indicate that high sexists recollect what/where units better for incongruent than for congruent information, whereas this difference was smaller for low sexists. Additionally, it was found that higher social relevance enhanced the incongruency effect. There was no interactive effect of sexism and social relevance on the recollection of incongruent versus congruent what/where units.
SECTION II: STRENGTH OF REGULATORY FOCUS AS MODERATOR
Let us now examine the influence of regulatory focus strength alone. Because effects not involving regulatory focus have already been presented, only the effects involving regulatory focus are presented in this section.
Likeability Ratings and Desire to Meet the Person. There were no effects. Emotions. As expected, there was a greater increase in agitation for participants with a strong prevention focus (M = 1.38) than participants with a strong promotion focus (M = .52), F(1,.123) = 8.50; p < .001. Intensity of agitation emotions also increased more with higher social relevance of the outcome (MHigh = 1.73, MMedium = .87; MLow = .23), as revealed by a main effect of social relevance, F(2, 123) = 8.64; p < .001. The interaction between regulatory focus and social relevance did not reach significance, F(2, 123) = 2.27, p > .10. There were no significant effects of regulatory focus or social relevance for dejection-related emotions, quiescence-related emotions, or cheerfulness-related emotions.
Recollection of Target Plus Background Information (i.e., what/where units).
The recollection scores are presented in Table 2 . Besides the effects described earlier, the analysis revealed a significant two-way interaction be- tween regulatory focus and congruency, F(2, 246) = 6.99; p < .001. This interaction reflects the fact that, as predicted, participants with a strong prevention focus had better memory for incongruent (M = .54 ) what/where units than for congruent (M = .24) or neutral (M = .17) what/where units, whereas this incongruency effect was much less for participants with a strong promotion focus (MIncongruent = .40; MCongruent = .33; MNeutral = .13). This difference in the incongruency effect between strong prevention and strong promotion focus was even greater when the participants expected to meet the person, as reflected in a significant three-way interaction, F(4, 246) = 4.06; p < .01. There were no further significant effects.
In sum, what/where units were better remembered for incongruent than congruent information when participants had a strong prevention focus but not when they had a strong promotion focus. This regulatory focus difference in the incongruency effect was especially strong when participants expected to meet the person.
SECTION III: STRENGTH OF REGULATORY FOCUS AND SEXISM AS MODERATORS: INTERACTIVE EFFECTS
Several multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the influence of the joint function of sexism and regulatory focus. The independent continuous variables for the analyses were: (a) participants' ought strength (the raw scores were z-transformed so that higher values signify higher ought strength); (b) their ideal strength (the raw scores were z-transformed so that higher values signify higher ideal strength); (c) their sexism scores (the raw scores were z-transformed so that higher values signify higher sexism); and (d) the interaction between sexism and ought strength (sexism scores * ought strength scores, where the product of the raw scores were z-transformed so that higher values signify higher sexism combined with high ought strength); and (e) the interaction between sexism and ideal strength (sexism scores * ideal strength scores, where the product of the raw scores were z-transformed so that higher values signify higher sexism combined with high ideal strength). Because of the three between-participant conditions of the social relevance factor, analyses were conducted for each of the social relevance groups separately.
Recollection of Incongruent What/Where Units. The mean proportion of recollection of incongruent what/where units was the dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis. In addition to the independent variables mentioned above, the analysis controlled for the amount of recollected congruent and neutral what/where units. In the low social relevance condition, no significant effects were obtained. In contrast, as predicted, in both the medium and high social relevance condition, the product term of sexism and ought strength was related to recollecting more incongruent what/where units, B = 1.02; t(35) = 6.31; p < .001, and B = .59, t(36) = 1.98, p = .05, respectively.
The analyses also found that ideal strength related to recollecting less incongruent what/where units in the high social relevance condition, B = -.74; t(36) = -2.72; p < .05, and the product term of sexism and ideal strength related to recollecting less incongruent what/where units in the medium social relevance condition, B = -1.05; t(35) = -6.63; p < .001. No other effects were significant.
In summary, when participants expected to meet the person or thought that he or she was a fellow Columbia undergraduate, the more they were sexist and had a strong prevention focus, the better they remembered incongruent what/where units. This relation was not found when participants thought that the person was fictitious or when participants had a strong promotion focus.
Recollection of congruent what/where units. The same analysis was conducted for the amount of recollected congruent what/where units, except that now we controlled for the amount of recollected incongruent and neutral what/where units. There were no significant effects in the low social relevance condition. In both the medium and the high social relevance condition, a negative correlation was found between ought strength and congruent what/where recollection, B = -.57, t(35) = -1.81; p < .10, and B = -.75; t(36) = -2.43; p < .05, respectively. Thus, when the information was socially relevant, the stronger was a participants' prevention focus, the fewer congruent what/where units were remembered. No other significant effects were obtained.
Emotions. In each of the analyses for each type of emotion, the three alternative types of emotion were entered as covariates. As predicted, the analyses revealed significant effects of sexism and regulatory focus only for agitation-related emotions. There were no significant effects in the low social relevance condition. In the medium social relevance condition, greater ought strength related to greater increase in agitation-related emotions, B = 0.82; t(34) = 2.74; p < .01, and greater ideal strength related to lesser increase in agitation-related emotions, B = -.65; t(34) = -2.19; p < .05. In the high social relevance condition, as predicted, the higher was participants' product of sexism and ought strength, the higher was the increase in their agitation-related emotions after reading about the target person, B = 0.93; t(35) = 6.10; p < .001.
To test the possibility that better memory for incongruent what/where units in the high social relevance condition was mediated by the increase in agitation-related emotions, the increase in agitation-related emotions was introduced into the regression model described above. In the high social relevance condition, this analysis revealed a remarkably reduced relation between the product of sexism and ought strength and recollecting more incongruent what/where units, B = .07; t(35) = .16; p > .85 (compared to B = .59, t(36) = 1.98, p = .05). This suggests that an increase in agitated emotions mediated the incongruency effect by increasing vigilant attention to incongruencies. In contrast, the negative correlation between the product term of ideal strength and sexism and the amount of recollected incongruent information was not mediated by emotions. These results suggest that threat and specifically agitation arousal are produced when people's valued beliefs are challenged, which increase vigilant attention to the disconfirming information, thereby increasing its subsequent configural recollection.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study replicates and significantly extends previous evidence (Förster et al., 2000) for a self-regulatory model of stereotype disconfirmation and self-defense. It demonstrates that the combination of prejudice, a strong prevention focus and social relevance of disconfirming information creates a threatening situation that produces a self-defensive reaction of agitated emotion and vigilant attention to the information, which in turn enhances memory for incongruent what/where units. The self-defensive nature of this process was especially evident when the information had high social relevance because in this case the increase in emotional agitation produced by the disconfirming information was shown to mediate the greater recollection of incongruent what/where units.
It is noteworthy that the disconfirming information did not increase other types of emotion, such as dejection, and other types of emotion did not mediate the memory effects. The results, therefore, were specific to emotional agitation which relates specifically to threat and vigilance. In addition, the greater recollection of incongruent what/where units occurred only for participants who had a strong prevention focus. It did not occur for participants who had a strong promotion focus. Once again, then, the results were specific to a strong prevention focus which relates specifically to threat and vigilance. Finally, the greater recollection of incongruent what/where units occurred only for participants who held prejudiced beliefs regarding the input information-the high sexist participants. Only for these participants would the disconfirming information be experienced as threatening. Together, this pattern of specificity strongly supports a self-defensive account of our findings.
It should also be noted that our findings do not contradict standard models of person memory (e.g. Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer & Martin, 1986) , which include the epistemic motivation to resolve an incongruency. According to such models, stereotypic beliefs allow easier processing of congruent than incongruent information. Because incongruent information needs additional processing, it is later remembered better. Our study extends this analysis by including background information that is simply not helpful to resolve the discrepancy between the cognitive elements. Thus, our results show that beyond epistemic motivation, the motivation to "prevent a threat to self regulation" can cause incongruency effects in its own right. Prevention threat can increase vigilant attention, which leads to better background memory for the threatening information in much the same way an animal learns the place of a threat in order to escape from it. One would expect the vigilant attention to be greater when the threatening information is more personally relevant. Consistent with this expectation, the results of the present study show even better memory for incongruent what/where information when the situation has higher personal relevance.
Our data show that the higher the combination of sexism and prevention focus, the higher the increase in emotional agitation when the situation has social relevance. There was no such effect for likeability ratings. This pattern of findings has some interesting implications for our model. It suggests, for example, that it is not the particular target person per se, such as an atypical woman, who is the threat (as is implied in some models of stereotyping: see, for example, Wilder, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1985) . Instead, the problem is the self-regulatory threat produced by a discrepancy with a valued belief about the world.
It should be noted that ignoring threatening information can also be an effective strategy, as Sedikides and Green (2000) have shown. Our research differs from Sedikides and Green's (2000) research. First, in our experiment the information cannot easily be ignored at the time of encoding since it occurs frequently and participants are explicitly asked to form an impression about a person. It also cannot easily be ignored at the time of recognition since the task is to recognize previously presented items. Because of these differences, it is not surprising that Sedikides and Green (2000) found a self-defensive effect of ignoring threatening information at the time of retrieval with a free recall task, whereas we found a self-defensive effect of vigilantly attending to threatening information at the time of encoding with a recognition task. More work has to be done to examine the conditions that determine when repression or suppression versus sensitization or vigilance occurs as self-defensive responses to threatening information. Finally, it should also be noted that despite the different self-defensive responses to threat, the psychological principles underlying the threat seem to be the same: self-relevance, diagnosticity, and inconsistency.
Our account of our findings also has implications for understanding when congruency and when incongruency effects occur (see Stangor & McMillan, 1992) . Shah and Higgins' (2003) work on in-group versus out-group perception shows, for example, that a promotion focus promotes the in-group, whereas a prevention focus prevents the out-group. To prevent the out-group, such as a stereotype disconfirmation, individuals are vigilant to "false alarms," or to what needs to be rejected, which leads to high attention for incongruence. To promote the in-group, like a stereotype confirmation, individuals are eager for hits, which leads to high attention for congruence. Thus, the congruency effect may be found more with self-relevant promotion, and the incongruency effect may be found more with self-relevant prevention.
Because we believe it is experiencing a threat that triggers the effects we find, our model of self-defensive reaction to belief disconfirmation is not restricted to the case of stereotype beliefs. If beliefs are self-relevant for an individual, such as a zoologist's belief that dinosaurs are lizards, disconfirming information that dinosaurs are actually birds, might be experienced as a threat, producing effects similar to those found in our study, especially if the belief is self-relevant (e.g. the zoologist's reputation or career is based on his or her theory). The same disconfirmation could be experienced simply as useful information without being threatening if the belief was not self relevant.
Our data support this reasoning, in that the increase of emotional agitation was found particularly for high sexist participants in a prevention focus, whereas no increase was found for participants in a promotion focus or for low sexist participants. Thus, disconfirmation might not cause threat for individuals who do not endorse stereotypic beliefs or are in a promotion focus of advancement and gains, which can be associated with an openness to change (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999) . This possibility would be worth exploring in future research.
Another possible direction for future research would be to consider other kinds of background information. Johnson & Raye, 1981) . For example, one could investigate whether self-defense mechanisms might improve memory for the source (e.g., "who said what"), which could have important implications for eyewitness memories and other applied fields. In this way, increased vigilant attention from threat could have beneficial effects. More generally, the potential trade-offs of self-defensive reactions to threat need to be explored more fully.
